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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The court in the instant case, by reaching its decision only after revers-
ing its first opinion on rehearing, illustrates its hesitancy in reversing a
strong case for the state on an error in evidence, the actual effect of which
on the outcome of the case may well be doubted.' 5 There are a number
of decisions in which courts have held that the comment of the prosecutor
on the failure of defendant to testify or proof of defendant's silence while
under arrest does not result in a miscarriage of justice warranting reversal
when defendant's guilt is otherwise clearly established.'8 The American
Law Institute and American Bar Association have adopted resolutions de-
claring that prosecutors should be permitted to comment upon the failure
of accused to testify at the trial'1 Although these resolutions deal with
failure to talk at the trial, rather than while under arrest, as in the in-
stant case, they indicate a tendency to relax the strict protection of the
privilege against self-incrimination. It is significant to note that the number
of states permitting an inference to be drawn from the failure of accused
to testify at the trial is gradually being enlarged.' 8
A. M. E.
INSURANCE-RECOVERY BY BENEFICIARY WHO IS CONVICTED OF VOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER AFTER KILLING INSURED-[Federal].-The wife of the de-
ceased insured, beneficiary of the policies in question, killed her husband
and was convicted of manslaughter. The insurance company filed a bill
of interpleader naming her among the defendants. From the record of the
criminal case the court found that the killing had occurred under circum-
stances amounting to a clear case of common law voluntary manslaughter,
there being no grades or degrees of the crime in Michigan.' Held: the
wrongful and intentional killing of the insured by the beneficiary precludes
15. The court says in the instant case, at page 753: "We think the
record shows that a strong case was made by the State." At page 754,
the court says: "There is no contention that the State's counsel referred
in argument to Dowling's refusal to discuss his whereabouts, or that they
contended his silence was an admission of guilt. In other words, there was
no aggravation of the error * * *"
16. State v. Howard (1890) 102 Mo. 142, 14 S. W. 937, 938; State v.
Murray (1895) 126 Mo. 611, 29 S. W. 700, 702. See State v. Lee (Mo.
1920) 225 S. W. 928, 930, where the court said: "But, even if the statement
aforesaid had not been withdrawn, and defendant's objection thereto had
been overruled, it would not have constituted reversible error in this case.
The evidence heretofore set out is clear and convincing as to defendant's
guilt." Contra, State v. Hogan (Mo. 1923) 252 S. W. 387, 389.
17. For discussion of these proposals, see Reeder, Comment Upon Failure
of Accused to Testify (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 41; Bruce, The Right to
Comment on the Failure of Defendant to Testify (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev.
226.
18. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 412, §2272. See Anderson, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (1940) 74 N. Y. L. Rev. 453, 458.
1. Mich. Stat. Anno. 28. 553, C. L., §16717. The statute simply penalizes
manslaughter, leaving it to be defined by common law.
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her from receiving any part of the proceeds of the policies. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. ,. MoDavid et al.2
Cases involving murder of the insured by the beneficiary uniformly hold
that there can be no recovery by him.3 Where the killing amounts to in-
voluntary manslaughter, the great weight of authority is that the bene-
ficiary is not barred.4 The attention of the courts in these cases has seldom
been directed at distinctions based on the nature of the homicide or the
presence or absence of any particular intent. However, no case has been
found permitting recovery where there was any design on the part of the
slayer to take the life of the insured,6 and every case which allows recovery
2. (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1941) 39 Fed. Supp. 228.
This comment does not consider the problem of the principal case with
reference to the effect of policy provisions, when they exist, against a killing
by the beneficiary, or in relation to statutes enacted in many states which
bear on this contingency. For discussion of these aspects of the problem
see Grossman, Rights and Liability of the Insurer When the Death of the
Insured is Caused by the Beneficiary or by an Assignee (1930) 10 B. U.
L. Rev. 281; Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another, A
Statutory Solution (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715.
3. N. Y. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong (1886) 117 U. S. 591;
Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1923) 245 Mass. 565, 139 N. E. 816,
27 A. L. R. 1517; Schmidt v. Northern Life Ass'n (1900) 112 Iowa 41, 83
N. W. 800, 51 L. R. A. 141, 84 Am. St. Rep. 323; Ohio State Life Ins. Co. v.
Barron (1935) 274 Mich. 22, 263 N. W. 786; Sharpless v. Grand Lodge(1916) 135 Minn. 35, 159 N. W. 1086, L. R. A. 1917B 670; Smith v.
Todd (1930) S. C. 323, 152 S. E. 506, 70 A. L. R. 1529.
4. Throop v. Western Indemnity Co. (1920) 49 Cal. App. 322, 193 Pac.
263; Schreiner v. High Court (1890) 35 Ill. App. 576; Minasian v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co. (1936) 295 Mass. 1, 3 N. E. (2d) 17; Hull v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. (1917) 26 Pa. Dist. Rep. 197; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Hill (1934) 115 W. Va. 515; 177 S. E. 188; but see In re Spark's Estate
(1939) 172 Misc. 642, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 926 (husband's right in estate of
intestate wife); De Zotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. (1932) 60
S. D. 532, 245 N. W. 58.
5. Additional discussion of this question is found in substantially similar
cases as to the right of a killer to take the property of his intestate victim
by descent. See Note (1927) 51 A. L. R. 1096. There are few pertinent
cases, however, owing no doubt to the past unwillingness of courts to en-
graft exceptions on statutes of descent and distribution which confer posi-
tive rights in clear and unambiguous language. The majority of Americanjurisdictions have held that a murderer may inherit, even though, the courts
declare, public policy would prevent recovery under rights granted by pri-
vate contracts, such as insurance contracts, or by wills. Note also that the
most recent cases support the minority view that these statutes grant no
such absolute rights. Garwols v. Bankers Trust Co. (1930) 251 Mich. 420,
232 N. W. 239; DeZotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. (1932) 60 S. D.
532, 245 N. W. 58; Parker v. Potter (1931) 200 N. C. 348, 157 S. E. 68;
Re Tyler's Estate (1926) 140 Wash. 679, 250 Pac. 456, 51 A. L. R. 1088,
and note following. Cf. Note (1927) 51 A. L. R. 1113 (murderer barred
from taking under will); Note (1927) 51 A. L. R. 1106 (qualifying right
of survivorship where tenant by the entireties murders co-tenant); see
Note (1931) 71 A. L. R. 277, 288 (murderer of spouse loses rights in
other's estate) for cases further illustrating the operation of this public
policy.
6. Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1936) 295 Mass. 1, 3 N. E. (2d) 17,
held that the rule established for murder "does not apply to a man-
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involves facts constituting involuntary manslaughter.7 But the decisions
simply lay down the broad proposition that murder will and manslaughter
will not preclude the beneficiary.8
It is a fundamental public policy of the common law that none shall be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.9 Courts agree that this
principle limits the right to acquire property as the result of a wrongful
killing. The decisions which apply this limitation to insurance cases have
developed a rule which is perhaps best discussed in Schreiner V. High
Court.10 Here, deciding on a demurrer, the court concluded that only a
wrongful and intentional homicide would operate to bar the beneficiary.1
This rule was always at least implicit12 and has been expressly adopted by
the subsequent decisions.13 But it is clear that the real basis of limiting
recovery is public policy, and that it is entirely a matter of opinion how
far that policy should extend. 4
slaughter where there was no intentional injury of a kind likely to cause
death."
7. The principal case is said to be one of first impression in the United
States, but see DeZotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. (1932) 60 S. D.
582, 245 N. W. 58, where the court cited murder cases and ruled, without
discussion, that a beneficiary who pleads guilty to a charge of voluntary
manslaughter is barred from recovery.
8. See Restatement, Restitution (1937) §189; 37 C. J. 576, §341.
9. An early statement of this principle is found in 1 Coke, On Littleton
(1853) 148b "nullus commodum capere potest iniuria sua propria." Byrne,
Broom's Legal Maxims, (9th ed., 1924) 197. Note that "iniuria" refers to
any civil wrong, intentional or otherwise.
10. (1890) 35 Ill. App. 576.
11. Other reasons assigned for the decision are that the killing by the
beneficiary of the insured is an impliedly accepted risk, and that, since the
policy would undoubtedly be void if expressly providing for payment to the
beneficiary in case of such homicide, it should not be so construed as to
allow him to recover when the policy is silent.
12. Most of the cases are concerned with murder by the beneficiary and
uniformly deny recovery, but murder is always an intentional crime, and
the courts did not refine the principle beyond the needs of the particular
situation.
13. See cases in note 5, supra; cf. In re Sparks' Estate (1939) 172
Misc. 642, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 926 which followed Riggs v. Palmer (1889)
115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188, 5 L. R. A. 340, 12 Am. St. Rep. 819, an early
New York decision denying any recovery, and rejected the notion that any
distinction in effect should be made between voluntary and involuntary man-
slaughter. This "would imply that the intentions of a killer ought to be
investigated." The court was concerned with the husband's rights in his
intestate wife's property where he was charged with her death and convicted
of first degree manslaughter, but the language applies equally well to
insurance cases. The English and the Canadian views are the same. Estate
of Hall (1914) 1 Probate 1; Lundy v. Lundy (1895) 24 Can. S. Ct. 650.
14. Further support for the rule that the intention is the important
element is found in fire insurance cases when the insured has caused the
destruction of the property. Those cases which deny recovery indicate that
the loss must result from the intentional act of the insured, or its equivalent.
See 26 C. J. 347, §443 and cases cited. Similarly, in life insurance cases,
recovery is permitted by the beneficiary of an insane insured who com-
mits suicide, 37 C. J. 553, §304. It has also been held that there may be
recovery to the use of an insane beneficiary who kills the insured. Holdom
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The instant case accepted the rule which emphasizes intention as the
crucial factor. The court said that the previous cases did not bar the killer
because he was a murderer, but because he intended to kill; or, that the
cases allowed recovery because that intention was absent. The opinion set
forth the hypothetical case of a woman who killed her husband by mistake
while engaged with him in deliberately attempting to cause the death of
their daughter's ravisher. By hypothesis the death of the husband would
be murder according to the rules of criminal law, but the court declared
that, on these facts, it would permit the wife to recover as the beneficiary
of her husband's life insurance policy. Such a killing, the court said, is
not intentional within the meaning of the insurance rule.15 The court then
quoted the common law definition of voluntary manslaughter as an inten-
tional crime and denied recovery in the principal case because of the
"wicked intentional killing." 0
The opinion of the court rests upon the principle that a beneficiary will
be barred when the facts show an "intentional" killing. The authorities
which have used this rule in insurance cases, and which have barred re-
covery, have held that the killing must be intentional in the sense that the
beneficiary must have been aware that the act would result in death. But,
in applying this rule, the court adopted a different basis for the meaning
of "intention." It treated the death as having been "intentional" because
the facts established the crime of voluntary manslaughter; and voluntary
manslaughter is defined (by criminal law) as an "intentional," i. e., a
volitional, crime.17 But it is very possible that one may be guilty criminally
of voluntary manslaughter without having had an awareness that death
would result from the acts in question.' 8 This reference to the general
rules of criminal law for definition of the term "intention" will most fre-
quently, but not always, lead to the same results as in earlier insurance
cases. Under this rule, recovery would be denied if criminal liability for
voluntary manslaughter would exist, although the facts might show that
there was not an awareness that death would result.
It has been shown that in the life insurance cases the real question in
issue is that regarding the extent of public policy against allowing one to
v. Ancient Order (1896) 159 Ill. 619, 43 N. E. 772, 50 Am. St. Rep. 183,
31 L. R. A. 67.
15. Query whether the court would allow recovery by a beneficiary who
sued on a policy after killing his insured by mistake while engaged with
him in the commission of a rape.
16. The court adopted the definition of voluntary manslaughter in Maher
v. People (1862) 10 Mich. 212, 218, 81 Am. Dec. 781. In part: "If the act
of killing, though intentional, is committed under the influence of pas-
sion * * * before a reasonable time has elapsed * * * for reason to resume
its habitual control, and is the result of temporary excitement by which
the control of reason was disturbed, rather than of any wickedness of
heart * * * "1
17. 29 C. J. 1125, §113.
18. 29 C. J. 1129, §116. See also 1 Wharton, Ciiminal Law (12th ed.)
646, §426. "Passion thus aroused must be so violent as to dethrone the rea-
son of the accused, for the time being; and prevent thought and reflection,
and the formation of a deliberate purpose."
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profit from his wrongful act. It is suggested that that policy is not best
served by reference to mechanical definitions established primarily for pur-
poses of criminal law. R. W. K.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - CouRSE OF EMPLOYMENT - STRET ACCI-
DENTS-[Missouri].-Claimant's duties required him to spend part of his
time on the street. As he was crossing the street, an automobile passed, and
a foreign substance was blown into his eye, injuring it. The award of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission was in favor of the employee, for an
"accident arising out of and in the course of his employment."' Held:
Reversed2 and remanded with instructions that if claimant could prove it
was the automobile which stirred up the dust, he should recover, but if
the dust was merely stirred up by the wind, recovery should be denied,
since in the latter case the hazard was one unconnected with his employ-
ment because one common to the public generally. Morrow v. Orscheln
Bros. Truck Lines.3
Recovery by an injured employee under the Workmen's Compensation
Act in situations of this kind depends upon whether the accident arose "out
of" the employment within the meaning of the legislation. The Missouri
rules with respect to whether various types of street accidents may be said
to arise "out of" the injured employee's work are in the formative stage.
There are few decisions involving this question, and until the instant one,
street accident cases have, in the main, been confined to situations in which
the employee was injured in or by a moving vehicle.4 The reason given
1. R. S. Mo. (1939) §3691.
2. The circuit court had reversed the award of the commission on the
sole ground that the claim for compensation was not filed within the time
allowed by law. The court of appeals found for claimant on this point.
3. (Mo. App. 1941) 151 S. W. (2d) 138.
4. Howes v. Stark Bros. Nurseries Co. (1930) 223 Mo. App. 793, 22 S. W.
(2d) 839 (employee on way to bus furnished by employer, struck by auto-
mobile); Wahlig v. Krenning-Schlapp Grocer Co. (1930) 325 Mo. 677, 29
S. W. (2d) 128 (salesman killed when car was struck by train); Sawtell v.
Stern Bros. & Co. (1931) 226 Mo. App. 485, 44 S. W. (2d) 264 (bond sales-
man in making temporary visit didn't materially deviate from course of
employment, so that injury when struck by, automobile arose out of and
in course of employment); Barlow v. Shawnee Inv. Co. (1932) 229 Mo.
App. 51, 48 S. W. (2d) 35 (collector for credit company killed as result of
accident when his car hit tree) ; Wyatt v. Kansas City Art Institute (1935)
229 Mo. App. 1166, 88 S. W. (2d) 210 (employee killed by automobile
when crossing street); Schroeder v. Western Union Tel. Co. (Mo. App.
1939) 129 S. W. (2d) 917 (messenger boy on bicycle injured by automo-
bile); McCoy v. Simpson (Mo. 1940) 139 S. W. (2d) 950 (salesman killed
when his car hit rear of another automobile). A number of cases involving
salesmen in automobile accidents have been decided on other grounds, and
the fact that the accident arose out of the employment seems to have been
assumed. See, e. g., Schulte v. Grand Union Tea & Coffee Co. (Mo. App.
1981) 43 S. W. (2d) 832; Duggan v. Toombs-Fay Sash & Door Co. (Mo.
App. 1933) 66 S. W. (2d) 973 (salesman had deviated from employment,
otherwise compensation would have been granted); Shroyer v. Missouri
Livestock Comm. Co. (1933) 332 Mo. 1219, 61 S. W. (2d) 713.
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